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revision 1.125 by benja, Mon May 19 18:59:39 2003 UTC revision 1.126 by tjl, Mon May 19 19:02:05 2003 UTC
# Line 29  for an Line 29  for an
29  unlimited time.  unlimited time.
30    
31  We discuss particularly an instance with  We discuss particularly an instance with
32  the full digital signature feature set,  the full digital signature feature set, 160-bit security,
33  which requires  which requires
34  a 110 KB signature, 175'072 hash invocations to create, and  a 110 KB signature, 175'072 hash invocations for signing, and
35  5'568 hash invocations to verify  5'568 hash invocations for verification.
36    On a more practical level, we discuss a
37  - probabilistic instance  probabilistically valid instance with 56-bit security
38    if only used for up to XXX signatures.
39    - (2^56 private keys)  The probabilistic scheme requires
40    a 28 KB sig, 175'096 hash invocations for signing, 1'408 hashes
41    - with p XXX safe to sign up to XXX docs  for verification.
   
   - 28 KB sig, 175'096 hashes to create, 1'408 hashes to verify  
42    
43  - we discuss applications  - we discuss applications
44    
 ..  we believe that as long as the random oracle,  
     used to generate the new private keys  
     and to implement the one-time signatures,  
     isn't broken, an exhaustive  
     key search is the only way to break the scheme.  
   
     - (however, we don't give full security analysis)  
   
45  Introduction  Introduction
46  ============  ============
47    
# Line 364  Conclusion Line 354  Conclusion
354    to work if only a predetermined number of documents is ever signed    to work if only a predetermined number of documents is ever signed
355    with a key.    with a key.
356    
357    - we believe that as long as the random oracle,
358      used to generate the new private keys
359      and to implement the one-time signatures,
360      isn't broken, an exhaustive
361      key search is the only way to break the scheme.
362    
363      - (however, we don't give full security analysis)
364    
365    - not worse than RSA, where giving more signatures increases    - not worse than RSA, where giving more signatures increases
366      the possibility of factoring      the possibility of factoring
367    

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