/[gzz]/manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst
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revision 1.124 by tjl, Mon May 19 18:58:39 2003 UTC revision 1.125 by benja, Mon May 19 18:59:39 2003 UTC
# Line 268  For example, Line 268  For example,
268             tv=5.57e+03 [~27.84ms])             tv=5.57e+03 [~27.84ms])
269    
270    
271    - Maybe also mention:
272    
273      Note that rejection of a wrong key the most time-critical
274      operation, in order to avoid DOSing through giving loads
275      of wrong signatures. If the adversary can only forge the
276      first `$b_0$` bits of the message, rejection of the sig
277      will only take `$\\frac{b_0}{b}$` of the above estimate.
278    
279      If the signed bits are the cryptographic hash of the
280      actual message, forging many bits may be hard.
281    
282    
283  Practical Variants  Practical Variants
284  ==================  ==================
285    
# Line 312  Conclusion Line 324  Conclusion
324  ==========  ==========
325    
326  - presented a new signature scheme with several benefits  - presented a new signature scheme with several benefits
327      as far as we know not found together so far
328    
329    - no trapdoor funcs    - no trapdoor funcs
330    
# Line 337  Conclusion Line 350  Conclusion
350    
351    - naturally not foolproof: e.g. hashes *do* get broken, REF    - naturally not foolproof: e.g. hashes *do* get broken, REF
352    
353      - signatures in practice do depend on a hash function for
354        long messages. however, it only needs to be collision-resistant,
355        not a random oracle
356    
357  - key idea: using the deterministic random oracle  - key idea: using the deterministic random oracle
358    to create a huge virtual tree of private keys,    to create a huge virtual tree of private keys,
359    
# Line 347  Conclusion Line 364  Conclusion
364    to work if only a predetermined number of documents is ever signed    to work if only a predetermined number of documents is ever signed
365    with a key.    with a key.
366    
367      - not worse than RSA, where giving more signatures increases
368        the possibility of factoring
369    
370  Acknowledgments  Acknowledgments
371  ===============  ===============
   
   
   
   

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