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revision 1.121 by tjl, Mon May 19 18:48:17 2003 UTC revision 1.122 by tjl, Mon May 19 18:56:07 2003 UTC
# Line 4  One-time Signature Key Boosting: Full Di Line 4  One-time Signature Key Boosting: Full Di
4    
5  Abstract:  Abstract:
6    
7  - recursive application of one-time signature to sign  We propose an new digital signature scheme based on
8    nodes along a single path through a virtual tree of  recursive application of an underlying
9    new pubkeys corresponding to privkeys  one-time signature scheme to sign
10    deterministically  nodes along a single path through a virtual tree of
11    generated by random oracle from the tree node  keys deterministically
12    generated by random oracle from the parent private keys.
13  - In conjunction with Merkle hash trees, used to generate  In conjunction with Merkle hash trees, our scheme
14    a family of trade-offed schemes whose time and space characteristics  is used to generate
15    depend linearly on the underlying one-time sig schemes'.  a family of schemes with a tradeoff between
16    time and space characteristics, which for all separate values
17  - good  of the tradeoff parameter
18    depend linearly on the characteristics
19    - existentially unforgeable in adaptive chosen message attack  of the underlying one-time signature scheme.
20    
21    - We believe that as long as the random oracle,  Our scheme has several advantages:
22      used to generate the new private keys  signatures are  
23      and to implement the one-time signatures,  existentially unforgeable in adaptive chosen message attack.
24      isn't broken, an exhaustive  Because the security of the scheme is based only on
25      key search is the only way to break the scheme.  one-way functions and a random oracle, i.e.
26    no trapdoor functions are used,
27    - (however, we don't give full security analysis)  the keys and signatures remain valid
28    for an
29    - unlimited time  unlimited time.
   
   - hash function strength, no trapdoor function required  
30    
31  - instance:  - instance:
32    
# Line 46  Abstract: Line 44  Abstract:
44    
45  - we discuss applications  - we discuss applications
46    
47    ..  we believe that as long as the random oracle,
48        used to generate the new private keys
49        and to implement the one-time signatures,
50        isn't broken, an exhaustive
51        key search is the only way to break the scheme.
52    
53        - (however, we don't give full security analysis)
54    
55  Introduction  Introduction
56  ============  ============
57    
# Line 327  Conclusion Line 333  Conclusion
333      verifying relatively slow      verifying relatively slow
334    
335      - considerable improvements      - considerable improvements
336        probably possible        may be possible
337    
338    - naturally not foolproof: e.g. hashes *do* get broken, REF    - naturally not foolproof: e.g. hashes *do* get broken, REF
339    

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