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revision 1.120 by benja, Mon May 19 18:35:30 2003 UTC revision 1.121 by tjl, Mon May 19 18:48:17 2003 UTC
# Line 2  Line 2 
2  One-time Signature Key Boosting: Full Digital Signature Feature Set without Trapdoor Functions  One-time Signature Key Boosting: Full Digital Signature Feature Set without Trapdoor Functions
3  ==============================================================================================  ==============================================================================================
4    
 ..  Benja: I'm restarting the writing.  
   
     We *don't* need to review all existing schemes, since I figured  
     our combination with merkle hashes still is a *linear* operation  
     from source to target characteristics. We'll get off much lighter  
     without reviewing, no need to search too much for optimums &c.  
   
     I'm sure the referees will tell us if we should review them...  
   
5  Abstract:  Abstract:
6    
7  - recursive application of one-time signature to sign  - recursive application of one-time signature to sign
8    nodes along a single branch of a tree of    nodes along a single path through a virtual tree of
9    new pubkeys corresponding to privkeys    new pubkeys corresponding to privkeys
10    deterministically    deterministically
11    generated by random oracle from the tree node    generated by random oracle from the tree node
# Line 25  Abstract: Line 16  Abstract:
16    
17  - good  - good
18    
19    - existentially unforgeable in adaptive chosen message attack,    - existentially unforgeable in adaptive chosen message attack
     even if underlying one-time-signature algorithm isn't  
20    
21    - We believe that as long as the random oracle,    - We believe that as long as the random oracle,
22      used to generate the new private keys      used to generate the new private keys
# Line 315  not a whole tree of private keys. Line 305  not a whole tree of private keys.
305  Conclusion  Conclusion
306  ==========  ==========
307    
308  - key idea: using the deterministic bit string for each privkey  - presented a new signature scheme with several benefits
309    
310      - no trapdoor funcs
311    
312      - This scheme is existentially
313        unforgeable with an adaptive chosen message attack.
314    
315      - no state beyond the private key: no need to keep track
316        of signed documents &c.
317    
318      - no need for expiration of key or signature
319    
320    - application in long-term digital publishing,
321      the time limits on normal digital signatures
322      are inconvenient
323    
324    - downsides
325    
326      - signatures relatively large and signing and
327        verifying relatively slow
328    
329        - considerable improvements
330          probably possible
331    
332      - naturally not foolproof: e.g. hashes *do* get broken, REF
333    
334    - key idea: using the deterministic random oracle
335      to create a huge virtual tree of private keys,
336    
337      - in one instance `$2^{160}$`, enough to have a separate private
338        key for each value to be signed.
339    
340    - also probabilistic, faster versions, which can be made
341      to work if only a predetermined number of documents is ever signed
342      with a key.
343    
344    
345    
 In long-term digital publishing, the time limits on normal digital signatures  
 are  
346    
 - we expect our methods to be improved on considerably; we have shown it is *feasible*,  
   now someone needs to show it's *practical*  
347    
 - hashes *do* get broken, REF  
348    

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