/[gzz]/manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst
ViewVC logotype

Diff of /manuscripts/Sigs/article.rst

Parent Directory Parent Directory | Revision Log Revision Log | View Patch Patch

revision 1.118 by tjl, Mon May 19 17:54:13 2003 UTC revision 1.119 by benja, Mon May 19 18:08:02 2003 UTC
# Line 28  Abstract: Line 28  Abstract:
28    - existentially unforgeable in adaptive chosen message attack,    - existentially unforgeable in adaptive chosen message attack,
29      even if underlying one-time-signature algorithm isn't      even if underlying one-time-signature algorithm isn't
30    
31    - As long as the random oracle, used to generate the new private keys    - We believe that as long as the random oracle,
32        used to generate the new private keys
33      and to implement the one-time signatures,      and to implement the one-time signatures,
34      isn't broken, an exhaustive      isn't broken, an exhaustive
35      key search is the only way to break the scheme.      key search is the only way to break the scheme.
36    
37      - (however, we don't give full security analysis)
38    
39    - unlimited time    - unlimited time
40    
41    - hash function strength, no trapdoor function required    - hash function strength, no trapdoor function required
# Line 41  Abstract: Line 44  Abstract:
44    
45    - Full DS feature set    - Full DS feature set
46    
47    - XXX KB sig, XXX hashes to create, XXX hashes to verify    - 110 KB sig, 175'072 hashes to create, 5'568 hashes to verify
48    
49  - probabilistic instance  - probabilistic instance
50    
51      - (2^56 private keys)
52    
53    - with p XXX safe to sign up to XXX docs    - with p XXX safe to sign up to XXX docs
54    
55    - XXX KB sig, XXX hashes to create, XXX hashes to verify    - 28 KB sig, 175'096 hashes to create, 1408 hashes to verify
56    
57  - we discuss applications  - we discuss applications
58    

Legend:
Removed from v.1.118  
changed lines
  Added in v.1.119

savannah-hackers-public@gnu.org
ViewVC Help
Powered by ViewVC 1.1.26