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One-time Signature Key Boosting |
One-time Signature Key Boosting |
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.. Benja: I'm restarting the writing. |
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We *don't* need to review all existing schemes, since I figured |
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our combination with merkle hashes still is a *linear* operation |
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from source to target characteristics. We'll get off much lighter |
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without reviewing, no need to search too much for optimums &c. |
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I'm sure the referees will tell us if we should review them... |
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Introduction |
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One-time Signatures |
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One-time Signature Key Boosting |
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Full Digital Signature Feature Set without Trapdoors |
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Practical Variants |
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Conclusion |
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- key idea: using the deterministic bit string for each privkey |
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In long-term digital publishing, the time limits on normal digital signatures |
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are |
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- we expect our methods to be improved on considerably; we have shown it is *feasible*, |
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now someone needs to show it's *practical* |
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- hashes *do* get broken, REF |
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