214 |
|
|
215 |
3) p2p open problems table: |
3) p2p open problems table: |
216 |
|
|
217 |
Problem description Solutions Comments/Status |
|
218 |
|
Problem Problem description Solutions Comments/Status |
219 |
Routing: Incorrect forwarding (hostile), Query monitoring, cross check Increases system complexity |
Routing: Incorrect forwarding (hostile), Query monitoring, cross check Increases system complexity |
220 |
incorrect routing (hostile) routing tables, verify routing tables, |
incorrect routing (hostile) routing tables, verify routing tables, |
221 |
create routing table invariants |
create routing table invariants |
225 |
|
|
226 |
Sybil attack: Single hostile entity present multiple Identify all nodes simultaneously Not practically realizable, |
Sybil attack: Single hostile entity present multiple Identify all nodes simultaneously Not practically realizable, |
227 |
entities across the system, collect pool of nodes research focused on persistence, |
entities across the system, collect pool of nodes research focused on persistence, |
228 |
which are validated, distributed not on distinction |
which are validated, distributed not on identity distinction |
229 |
node ID creation |
node ID creation |
230 |
|
|
231 |
Spam attack: Hostile entity creates false versions Do not trust to single entity, Efficient, easy to implement, |
Spam attack: Hostile entity creates false versions Do not trust to single entity, Easy to implement, |
232 |
of data get information from multiple entities, creates more network traffic |
of data get information from multiple entities, creates more network traffic |
233 |
trust on majority's opinion |
trust on majority's opinion |
234 |
|
|
235 |
Resource spoofing: Hostile entity gives wrong information Do not trust to single entity, Efficient, easy to implement, |
Resource spoofing: Hostile entity gives wrong information Do not trust to single entity, Easy to implement, |
236 |
about the data which entity is responsible get information from multiple entities, creates more network traffic |
about the data which entity is responsible get information from multiple entities, creates more network traffic |
237 |
for/knows about trust on majority's opinion |
for/knows about trust on majority's opinion |
238 |
|
|
239 |
Sudden network partition: Sub network is isolated from other network Self-tuning, environment observatorion, Creates more overhead/space |
Sudden network partition: Sub network is isolated from other network Self-tuning, environment observatorion, Creates more overhead/space |
240 |
because of network disconnection backup connections requirements per node |
because of network disconnection backup connections requirements per node |
241 |
|
|
242 |
Searching: Efficient searching requires exploiting View trees, bloom filters Effective, but not flexible |
Searching: Efficient searching requires exploiting View trees, bloom filters and its Effective, but not flexible |
243 |
of previous queries |
of previous queries variations |
244 |
|
|
245 |
Efficient data discovery: Find resources efficiently, if resource Super nodes, node clusters, Morre effiecient, less network traffic, |
Efficient data discovery: Find resources efficiently, if resource Super nodes, node clusters, More effiecient, less network traffic, |
246 |
exists (broadcasting) caching techiques not comparable to DHT's efficiency |
exists (broadcasting) caching techiques not comparable to DHT's efficiency |
247 |
|
|
248 |
Entity identification: Identify participating entities reliably Digital signatures, key infrastrucure Research focused on persistence, |
Entity identification: Identify participating entities reliably Digital signatures, key infrastrucure Not practically realizable |
249 |
and efficiently not on distinction of identity |
and efficiently |
250 |
|
|
251 |
Fail Stop: A faulty node stops working Environment observatorion, informing Creates more network traffics, |
Fail Stop: A faulty node stops working Environment observatorion, informing Creates more network traffics, |
252 |
protocols node's information can be outdated |
protocols node's information can be outdated |
261 |
Robustness: How well system performs under hostile Self-tuning, backup links, use Working solutions |
Robustness: How well system performs under hostile Self-tuning, backup links, use Working solutions |
262 |
attacks/in the case of severe failure ? diverse routing paths |
attacks/in the case of severe failure ? diverse routing paths |
263 |
|
|
264 |
Quality of Service, QoS: The system cannot promise the quality of Use Network proximity Increases system complexity, no real world |
Quality of Service: The system cannot promise the quality of Use Network proximity Increases system complexity, no real world |
265 |
service in all cases for better network performance experiences |
service in all cases for better network performance experiences |
266 |
(bandwidth, latency, jitter, packet |
(bandwidth, latency, jitter, packet |
267 |
loss) |
loss) |
280 |
Malicious nodes: There are malicious nodes in the system, Create invariants for node behaviour, Partial solutions, self-certifying data most realiable |
Malicious nodes: There are malicious nodes in the system, Create invariants for node behaviour, Partial solutions, self-certifying data most realiable |
281 |
how we are able to discover them ? verify invariants, self-certifying data |
how we are able to discover them ? verify invariants, self-certifying data |
282 |
|
|
283 |
Mutual distrust: Nobody trust anybody, this is a problem Different reputation methods, key Resource demanding, not practical to |
Mutual distrust: Nobody trust anybody Different reputation methods, key Resource demanding, not practical to |
284 |
infrastructures implement/not working solutions, no real world |
infrastructures implement/not working solutions, no real world |
285 |
experience in a wide scale |
experience in a wide scale |
286 |
|
|
316 |
in peer-to-peer network ? because they are hard/not practically realizable |
in peer-to-peer network ? because they are hard/not practically realizable |
317 |
|
|
318 |
System in flux: Nodes join and leave system constantly: Half-life phenomenon (for analysis), Initial theoretical anasysis has been created, but |
System in flux: Nodes join and leave system constantly: Half-life phenomenon (for analysis), Initial theoretical anasysis has been created, but |
319 |
load balancing, efficiency ? simple overlay and construction protocol not comprehensive model for analysing different |
load balancing, efficiency ? simple overlay maintenance and construction not comprehensive model for analysing different |
320 |
system states |
protocol system states |
321 |
|
|
322 |
Inconsistent behaviour: Hostile node could act correctly with Public keys, digital signatures Not practical approach/working proposal created yet |
Inconsistent behaviour: Hostile node could act correctly with Public keys, digital signatures Not practical approach/working proposal created yet |
323 |
its neighbors, but incorrectly with other |
its neighbors, but incorrectly with other |